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Oklahoma State UniversityI. Introduction
Parents’ decisions about whether and how much to invest in their children’s
human capital depend on many factors, and these decisions have long-lasting
impacts on each child’s future earnings, marital prospects, and overall welfare.
A large literature attempts to understand the source of inequalities for children’s
educational investments within a household building on seminal work by
Becker and Tomes (1976) that delineates the trade-off between the quantity of
children and their “quality.” In making the schooling investment decision,
parents will have information about a child’s ability, and that information willThese data were collected for a project evaluating social protection strategies in Burkina Faso, which
greatly benefited from the support of Marie-Claire Damiba, Seydou Kabré, and Victorine Yameogo
from the Secrétariat Permanent du Comité National de Lutte contre le SIDA et les Infections
Sexuellement Transmissibles in Burkina Faso and Hans Binswanger, Nono Ayivi-Guedehoussou,
Ousmane Haidara, Timothy Johnston, Mead Over, and Tshiya Subayi-Cuppen at the World Bank.
Data collection was supervised by Robert Ouedraogo, Jean-Pierre Sawadogo, Bambio Yiriyibin, and
Pam Zahonogo from the University of Ouagadougou, Department of Economics. The project is
funded by the National Bureau of Economic Research Africa Project and the following World Bank
trust fund grants: Strategic Impact Evaluation Fund, Bank-Netherlands Partnership Program, Gender
Action Plan, Knowledge for Change Program, and Luxembourg Poverty Reduction Partnership. We
would also like to thankGerman Caruso for research assistance and two anonymous reviewers, Harold
Alderman, Kathy Baylis, Eric Edmonds, Don Fullerton, Craig Gundersen, Christopher Ksoll, Nolan
Miller, Elizabeth Powers, and participants at the T. Paul Schultz festschrift conference and seminars at
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign for helpful comments on earlier drafts. The findings,
interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this article are entirely ours. They do not represent the
views of the World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries they represent.
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158 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eoften not be available to researchers, which partly explains why much of the
empirical research on the determinants of household investments in children’s
schooling focuses on easy to observe demographic characteristics of the child
such as gender, birth order, and family composition (Parish and Willis 1993;
Garg and Morduch 1998; Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 2005).1 More recent
papers attempt to use direct measurements of a child’s ability such as IQ scores
(Kim 2005) or cognitive tests (Ayalew 2005) to better understand which
factors influence investment decisions.
In this article, we build on the seminal work by Rosenzweig and Schultz
(1982) to examine the role that a child’s cognitive ability plays in a resource-
constrained household’s decision to invest in that child’s education. For poor
households trying to maximize the returns to their human capital investments,
schooling decisions will depend on parents’ perceptions about the returns to
school for a given child and that child’s ability. Few households in rural Burkina
Faso ever enroll all of their children in school (in our data only 27% do so). In
such a setting, understanding the link between child ability and school
enrollment and school continuation decisions is critical for developing policy
prescriptions to improve educational outcomes.
We make four main contributions to the literature on explaining household
school investment decisions. First, we employ direct measures of a child’s
ability for all children of primary school age (5–15), regardless of whether they
are currently enrolled in school. This differs from existing studies that tend to
have ability measures only for children who are currently enrolled in school
(Glick and Sahn 2010). We use the Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices
(CPM) and theWechsler Intelligence Scales (WISC) Digit Span as measures of
a child’s cognitive ability. Second, our study is unique in explicitly incorpo-
rating direct measures of the ability of each child’s siblings (both absolute and
relative measures) and to show how sibling ability “rivalry” exerts a strong
impact on the parents’ decision of which child to send to school. Such rivalry
could explain the high level of variation in enrollment across siblings within a
family that we observe in our data and in rural Burkina Faso in general. Third,
the survey instrument asks parents to provide their perceptions about the likely
chances of future economic success for each of their children, information that
is not often gathered in surveys.We show that a similar pattern of sibling rivalry
is observed using either these parent perceptions or the externally validated1 See Strauss and Thomas (1995) and Glewwe and Kremer (2006) for reviews of the literature.
Related research explores the relationship between these demographic characteristics and the
nonschooling outcomes of employment (Kessler 1991), risky behaviors (Aizer 2004), and child
labor (Emerson and Souza 2008).
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endogeneity concerns about schooling influencing measures of child ability by
exploiting the panel data structure and focusing on the relationship between
the enrollment decision in the survey’s second year and the ability measures
observed in the survey’s first year for the subset of young children who were not
enrolled and not yet of typical school age in the first year.
We explore both the extensive margin of school enrollment during the
2007–8 school year and grade progression measures, as well as the intensive
margin of school-related expenses. We find that a child with a one standard
deviation higher ability test score has a 16% higher likelihood of being
currently enrolled in school, while a child with a higher-ability sibling is 15%
less likely to be currently enrolled and having two higher-ability siblings lowers
a child’s probability of enrollment by 30%. Household fixed-effects regressions
show that within a given household, a child with one standard deviation higher
ability compared to the average ability of his or her siblings is 30%more likely
to be enrolled. On the intensive margin, controlling for household fixed effects,
we find that a child with one standard deviation higher ability receives 21%
more discretionary school expenditures by the parents.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section II discusses the
conceptual framework about sibling rivalry and the household schooling
investment decision. Section III describes the survey data used in the analysis
and explains the construction of the different child ability measures. Section IV
describes the empirical identification strategy, and Section V presents the main
results as well as robustness tests. Section VI presents conclusions.
II. Sibling Rivalry Conceptual Framework
Sibling rivalry represents the idea that within a household there is competition
among siblings for limited resources. When market constraints (such as credit,
capital, or labor) bind, all else equal, a child who has fewer siblings who are
comparatively higher valued will be better off. Traditionally, the sibling rivalry
literature for developing countries has focused on sibling sex composition and
measuring the number of sisters that a given child has. The reason is that in
cultures with a pro-male bias, investments in girls will generally have lower
returns than investments in boys, and so having more sisters (i.e., siblings with
lower returns) reduces competition for scarce resources and raises investments
in all children. Sibling rivalry in child investments in poor countries is well
documented (Parish and Willis [1993] for Taiwan, Binder [1998] for Mexico,
Garg and Morduch [1998] for Ghana, Morduch [2000] for Tanzania,
Edmonds [2007] for Nepal, Ota and Moffatt [2007] for India, and Dammert
[2010] for Guatemala and Nicaragua).This content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:34:52 PM
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behavioral models may differ. For instance, Garg and Morduch (1998) focus
on credit constraints and differences in relative returns to investments in boys
and girls as the cause for sibling rivalry. On the other hand, Edmonds (2007)
and Dammert (2010) emphasize that when girls have comparative advan-
tage in home production and it is not possible to hire labor for those tasks,
both boys and girls will benefit from having more sisters, given the number
of siblings, an outcome that is observationally indistinguishable from Garg
and Morduch’s (1998). In our study, by comparing direct measures of ability
across siblings, our approach provides a test of sibling rivalry that does not
depend on assumptions of gender bias in returns to education (Garg and
Morduch 1998) or on division of labor based on gender (Edmonds 2007;
Dammert 2010).
Most previous tests of sibling rivalry neglect that parents have additional
knowledge about their children’s capabilities and use this information to make
school investment decisions. A literature embedded in testing the one-period
consensus parental preferences model of human capital investment of Becker
and Tomes (1976) and Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman (1982) uses child
endowments in modeling the investment decision.2 Most studies that examine
the investment decision process have to work around the fact that actual child
ability or endowment is typically not observed (Behrman et al. 1982;
Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982; Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman 1994).
Some recent studies are able to use direct measures of child ability. Kim (2005)
uses an IQ test administered to Wisconsin high school juniors and finds that
higher-ability children receive more parent transfers. Glick and Sahn (2010)
use achievement test scores from Senegalese children taken in grade 2 to
explain school outcomes 7 years later, but this neglects the role of siblings who
may not have been enrolled in school.
In the study most closely related to ours, Ayalew (2005) uses Raven’s CPM
test scores for school-age children in one village in Ethiopia to measure child
ability and, using a household fixed-effects model, finds that parents consider
child ability when making school enrollment decisions. There are several key
differences between our studies. First, we focus on absolute and relative direct
measures of the ability of a child’s siblings to generate inferences about the role
of sibling rivalry in influencing schooling decisions. Second, we explore both
alternative ability measures by using different cognitive tests and alternative
outcomes such as school expenditures and grade progression, in addition to
current enrollment, which is the focus of the Ayalew article. Third, we exploit2 See Behrman (1997) for an overview of the consensus parental preferences models.
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causality concerns about schooling influencing measures of child ability.
III. Burkina Faso Social Protection Evaluation Survey
The panel survey was conducted in June 2008 (year 1) and June 2009 (year 2)
in Nahouri Province in southern Burkina Faso, located approximately 100
miles from the capital and bordering Ghana. Households were randomly
selected from a village-level census conducted by our project team immediately
prior to the round 1 survey in the 75 rural villages of Nahouri Province that
each has a primary school. The survey is part of an ongoing project evaluating
social protection strategies in Burkina Faso. Households in this region are
predominantly subsistence farmers growing sorghum and groundnuts and
have mean annual per capita expenditures of approximately $90.
Our analysis focuses on primary school–aged children (5–15) in households
with multiple biological children of the household head. There are 4,641
children in this age range in 1,507 different households.3 As shown in table 1,
parental schooling is low, with only 13% of the children having a parent who
ever attended school. In this children’s sample, 54% are male, and the average
age is 9.4 years. On average, these children have 3.8 siblings under age 15,
including 1.8 sisters. They live in households with an average of 8.9 indi-
viduals, including a head of household, 1.5 wives, 4.8 biological children of the
household head under age 15, 0.4 children under age 15 who are not the
biological children of the head, and 1.2 other members that include grand-
parents, aunts, uncles, and other extended family members.
Parents were directly asked about the chance of future success they believe
each of their children will have in formal employment, a reasonable measure of
parental perceptions about the investment return on their child’s education,
since most jobs in “formal employment” in Burkina Faso require a level of
education beyond primary school and in particular French skills. This parental
perception measure is based on everything the parent knows about the child
and about the labor market, whether right or wrong, and was asked about every
child in the household. For each child, the parents responded whether that
particular child had a “small,” “medium,” “large,” or “very large” chance of
future success in formal employment. Parents considered 25% of these
children to have a small chance of future success and only 8% to have a very3 All children in the regression sample are resident biological children of the household head. This
means that there are no resident foster children included in the regressions. Furthermore, 3.9% of
all children are nonresident, and these children are excluded from the analysis as their ability was not
measured.
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Household size 8.88 3.81
Number of wives 1.46 .95
Number of siblings 3.81 2.32
Number of sisters 1.79 1.50
Number of nonbiological children in household .41 .89
Male (fraction male) .54 .50
Age 9.41 2.99
Birth order 2.27 1.34
Proportion either parent ever enrolled .13 .34
Log household assets 12.36 1.49
Parent perception of chance child succeeds
in formal employment:
Percentage small chance 25
Percentage medium chance 38
Percentage large chance 29
Percentage very large chance 8
Raven’s raw test score 4.86 3.35
Own ability (Raven’s age-adjusted z-score) −.01 1.01
WISC raw test score 7.58 4.56
WISC age-adjusted z-score −.02 .99
Average grades completed 1.81 2.08
Proportion children currently enrolled .54 .50 56
Proportion children ever enrolled .59 .49 54
Proportion children with an on-time start .40 .49 55
Grade progression .52 .48
Discretionary education expenditures (in FCFA) 841 1,752
Number of households 1,507
Number of children 4,641
Source. Burkina Faso Social Protection Evaluation data from 2008.
Note. All summary statistics are based on information for the 4,641 children aged 5–15 in year 1 unless
otherwise noted. Household assets aremeasured in FCFA (FCFA415 =US$1), and the variable is createdby
taking the log of the sum of household durable goods and livestock. Parent perceptions of the chance their
child succeeds in formal employment range from 0 to 3, with 0 indicating a small chance and 3 indicating a
very large chance. Own ability is measured using the Raven’s CPM and normed by age (z-score). Timely
start indicates if the child started school by age 7 or younger. Grade progression in school is the child’s
grade in school divided by the number of years since the child started attending school and ranges from 0
to 1. Discretionary education expenditures are the sum of per-child expenses for school supplies and
parent association fees in FCFA. Summary statistics for grade progression are based on only 4,487 children
because of missing data on the number of years since the child started attending school.
162 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Elarge chance of future success. Parents viewed most children (67%) to have a
medium (38%) or large (29%) chance of future success.
To corroborate these parent perceptions, we also examine externally vali-
dated measures about a child. We use the Raven’s CPM and the WISC Digit
Span to measure a child’s cognitive ability; both tests do not require formal
schooling to be able to answer the questions. The Raven’s CPM is a measure of
fluid intelligence or problem-solving ability. The test does not depend heavilyThis content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:34:52 PM
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child respondent is asked to select the image that is missing in order to
complete a given picture (Raven, Raven, and Court 1998). This type of
question is novel to the children in Nahouri Province, thus providing a more
natural or true measure of problem-solving skills.
We ask 18 questions from the Raven’s CPM, and on average, children in our
sample answer 4.9 questions correctly.4 Younger children answer fewer ques-
tions correctly than older children (the average number correct for children
age 5 is 2.8 and for children age 15 is 7.6).5 To control for this relationship
between age and raw test scores, we calculate a z-score for each child measured
as the child’s raw test score minus the average score for the same-age children
divided by the standard deviation of test scores for children of that age.6
Therefore, the mean of the Raven’s z-score is zero and the standard deviation is
one for each age and across all ages.7
The WISC Digit Span is a measure of working memory and ability to
concentrate and has both a forward and a backward component. The re-
spondent repeats a string of numbers to the enumerator and is scored by
whether or not he or she repeats the full string correctly (Wechsler 1974). In
the Digit Span Forward, the child must repeat the string of numbers exactly as
stated by the enumerator. The string of numbers increases in length as the child
answers correctly. With the Digit Span Backward, similar strings of numbers
are to be repeated in the reverse order from that stated by the enumerator until
the child can no longer continue. We calculate a total combined score of the
forward and backward digit spans, and the children have an average score of
7.6 correct answers out of a total possible 32.8 As with the Raven, we calculate
a WISC Digit Span age-adjusted z-score to control for age effects.
In table 1, we present summary statistics about children’s schooling. Few
households in rural Burkina Faso ever enroll all of their children. Only 54% of
children are enrolled in the 2007–8 school year. Fifty-six percent of households
experience variation in enrollment among their children aged 5–15, while 17%4 During extensive pretesting of the Raven’s test, results were consistent whether children were
asked the entire set of 36 questions or only the odd-numbered questions. So to save interview time,
we administered only the 18 odd-numbered questions (sets A, Ab, and B).
5 The average number of questions answered correctly for children aged 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
and 14 is, respectively, 2.8, 3.6, 4.4, 5.1, 5.3, 5.6, 6.1, 6.5, and 6.4.
6 We did not use the international Raven’s norming standards since we asked a subset of the Raven’s
test; what is most important here is how the children in rural Burkina Faso compare to each other,
not internationally.
7 Note that in Sec. V.B, we estimate alternative specifications to test the robustness of using the
Raven’s age-adjusted z-score instead of the raw test scores.
8 Our regression results are robust to keeping the forward and backward digit span scores separate.
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164 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eenroll no children and only 27% of households currently enroll all of their
primary school–aged children. If we consider whether a child has ever been
enrolled in school rather than current enrollment during 2007–8, then 59% of
children in the sample have ever been enrolled and 54% of households
experience variation across their children in whether a child has ever been
enrolled. Given these low enrollment rates, on average these children have
completed only 1.8 years of school.
In addition to examining the relationship between parent perceptions, child
ability, and school enrollment, we explore three alternative schooling-related
outcomes (on-time start, grade progression, and discretionary school expenses)
in which sibling rivalry might matter. In Burkina Faso, parents typically enroll
their children starting at age 7, so we construct a variable to indicate if children
started school by this age or if they were delayed. The “on-time start” variable
shows that only 40% of primary school–aged children start school by age 7,
with the rest either starting at a later age or never attending school. Fifty-five
percent of households have variation across their children in whether each
child started school by age 7. Second, we consider grade progression through
school, which we calculate by dividing the child’s highest grade attended by
the number of years since the child started school.9 The grade progression
measure ranges from zero to one, with higher numbers indicating quicker
progress toward completing primary school. Third, for each child we calculate
the total schooling-related discretionary expenditures during the 2007–8 school
year. While school in Burkina Faso has relatively low registration fees (FCFA
904 on average per year, about $2.18 using the June 2008 exchange rate of
FCFA 415 = US$1), there are additional expenditures expected of each family
when they enroll their child. These can include the purchase of uniforms,
contributions for the school cafeteria, and transportation costs. Spreading
resources evenly across children to pay the fixed costs associated with schooling
may not be possible in the presence of liquidity constraints. However, for some
of these expenditures, such as school supplies and parent association fees,
parents have discretion in the amount spent each year on a child who is
enrolled, and these discretionary expenditures are important in this setting as
well as in developing countries that currently have free schooling. In our
sample, the total average cost of sending a child to school is FCFA 3,867 per
school year (about $9.32), with parents spending, on average, FCFA 841
(about $2.04) on these discretionary items per child (about 22% of total
educational expenses).9 Children who never attended school are assigned a grade progression measure of zero.
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A. Econometric Specification
Studies of sibling rivalry in education typically use counts of the number of
siblings and the number of sisters that a child has to explain different schooling
outcomes (attendance, enrollment, attainment) as follows:
eih ¼ q0Sih þ q1Fih þ a0Xih þ a1Zh þ εih; ð1Þ
where eih is the educational outcome for child i in household h, Sih is a count of
the number of siblings the child has, Fih is a count of the number of female
siblings the child has, Xih is a vector of individual characteristics such as age and
gender that might influence parental investments, Zh is a vector of household
characteristics, and εih is a random, idiosyncratic error term. The interpretation
of q0 is the change in eih associated with an additional male sibling. The
interpretation of q1 is the change in eih associated with the thought experiment
of converting a sibling from a male to a female. The sum of q0 þ q1 is then the
change in eih associated with adding an additional female sibling. This approach
takes current family size and composition as given at the time the parents make
the enrollment decision.
To better understand parental schooling investment decisions, we expand
on the sibling rivalry model in equation (1) to control for previously unob-
served characteristics about the child (his ability) and his home environment
(his siblings’ ability) that might influence the parents’decision.We employ two
empirical approaches to estimate this relationship. First, we estimate the
following household or sibling fixed-effects conditional logit regression that
will control for all household-level characteristics that are constant across
siblings (Chamberlain 1980):
eih ¼ b0Aih þ a0Xih þ lh þ hih; ð2Þ
where eih and Xih are defined as above, Aih is a direct measure of observed child
ability, lh is the household fixed effect that captures all characteristics about the
household that are constant across siblings, and hih is the child-specific idio-
syncratic error term. In equation (1) and previous sibling rivalry papers, child
ability was part of the error term, εih, but in our analysis we are able to directly
control for its effect on educational outcomes.10 This within-family estimate
compares a child’s own ability to the average ability of all the other children in10 Note that in the household fixed-effects specification, household characteristics, Zh, and number of
siblings, Sih, will drop out of the specification because there is no variation across children within the
household. In the household fixed-effects regressions, we also drop the variable for number of sisters,
Fih, because it is constant within a given household for children of the same gender.
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166 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Ethe household to examine if parents compare a child’s ability to the average
ability of his siblings when making human capital investment decisions.
While the household fixed-effects estimation compares own ability to
average sibling ability, the second approach we adopt is to be more specific
about the functional form of the sibling ability term and to include direct
measures of sibling ability in the regression. This approach has the additional
advantage that we can include the same variables as in the sibling rivalry
literature (in eq. [1]) and allows us to examine how the relevant coefficients
vary when also controlling for a child’s own ability and his sibling’s ability. We
estimate the following extended equation (1) sibling rivalry regression:
eih ¼ b0Aih þ b1hðA −ihÞ þ q0Sih þ q1Fih þ a0Xih þ a1Zh þ mih; ð3Þ
where hðA −ihÞ is a measure of the ability of the other children (−i) in household
h with varying functional forms that we discuss in detail below, and the other
variables are as defined above. The error term, mih, measures the child-specific
idiosyncratic part of εih not captured by a child’s own ability, Aih, or his sibling’s
ability, hðA −ihÞ. The coefficients b0 and b1, respectively, give an estimate of the
impact of child i’s own ability and his sibling’s ability on child i’s enrollment.
We use several alternative measures of sibling ability, hðA −ihÞ, including both
absolute measures (highest sibling ability) and relative measures (whether there
are any siblings with a higher ability score and dummies for the number of
siblings with higher ability scores). Absolute measures provide insight into the
role of the level of sibling ability in a household. Having siblings with high
ability might represent competition for the child. However, if the high-ability
siblings provide spillovers in learning to the child (such as tutoring) or if there
are economies of scale in sending multiple children to school (such as sharing
school supplies), then high-ability siblings could raise a child’s own enrollment.
It could be that the average level of sibling ability affects a child’s enrollment
differently than the ability level of the household’s “best” sibling (with the
highest ability). If sibling rivalry influences parents’deciding whom to send to
school, then parents might consider how a child compares in ability to his
siblings rather than considering the child’s ability on its own, and relative
sibling ability measures might be more informative. In our sample, 40% of the
overall variation in ability arises from within-family variation across siblings,
while 60% is between families.
B. Potential Threats to Identification Strategy
There are two main potential threats to our identification strategy. The first is
that since schooling potentially affects cognitive ability, reverse causality is a
possible problem we face. We attempt to address this in two ways. First, weThis content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:34:52 PM
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grade 2 and lower or to grade 1 and lower. The decision to use this grade cutoff
point is based on a regression of the Raven’s age-adjusted z-score on grade in
school, and the coefficients for grades 1 and 2 are close to zero (0.05 and 0.09,
respectively) and not statistically significant. The coefficients for grades 3 and 4
are slightly larger (0.14 and 0.12, respectively), but only the grade 3 coefficient
is statistically significant whereas the grade 4 coefficient is not statistically
significant. We interpret this lack of relationship between the lower grades and
ability test scores as evidence that children in grade 2 and lower have not yet
received enough schooling to influence their cognitive ability test scores.11 On
the basis of this information and to be conservative in our robustness
specifications, we select grades 1 and 2 as the cutoff levels. Second, we restrict
the sample to young children aged 5–7 (and 5–6) who are not enrolled in year 1
but for whomwe have ability measures in year 1 and look at their enrollment in
year 2. This eliminates any potential effect of schooling on the ability measures
as these children were not enrolled at the time of taking the ability test.
The second potential threat to our identification strategy is that the Raven’s
test score is not just capturing the child’s ability endowment but also reflects the
complete history of all parental investments in the child, in particular,
investments in early childhood nutrition, which are critical in this poor
environment, and it is unlikely that these investments are randomly allocated
among siblings. If parents are equity minded, they might compensate for
unequal initial endowments among their children by providing more resources
to those who have worse health. In this case, the current gap in observed ability
between siblings will understate the actual ability difference, and this will bias11 Our interpretation about the lack of relationship between the lower grades and ability involves
the implicit assumption that either parents do not take into account child ability when they make
schooling decisions or, if they do take ability into account, they always favor the more able children
to attend school. If this assumption is violated so that the least able children are sent to school
(because either parents take a compensating strategy or they act efficiently but the marginal rate of
return to education is higher for the least able children), then we could observe no relationship
between schooling and ability because the positive effects of schooling on ability are offset by the
negative selection of low-ability children into school. While we do not think that parents’ giving
more schooling to their low-ability children is likely, this robustness check cannot completely rule
out that possibility, so we offer two reasons supporting this assumption. First, Kazianga (2004) and
Schultz (2004), using Burkina Faso nationally representative data, report substantial returns
(9%–16%) for an additional year of primary school, with returns to secondary (14%–26%) and
tertiary (13%–23%) schooling even higher. Given that the rate of return to education is increasing
in years of schooling, we conjecture that parents are more likely to enroll children who are perceived
to be able to progress through the most grades. Second, in an environment in which private transfers
among kin are common (Kazianga 2006), even if parents take a compensating strategy (over lifetime
well-being), they could still choose to allocate more schooling to the most able of their children and
expect that the well-off children will make transfers to the worse-off ones.
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168 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Ethe estimated effect of ability endowment downward. Alternatively, if parents
are efficiency minded, they might provide more resources to their most robust
children, in which case, the sibling ability gap is overstated and the estimated
effect of ability endowment is biased upward. While we do not have the
necessary data to fully address these biases, we can control for the nutritional
and health investment history of the child by including the child’s height for
age z-score in the regression as an additional control variable. In these modified
regressions, height for age z-scores have no significant effect on enrollment and
they do not alter the relationship between ability and enrollment, providing
some evidence that our results are not driven by parental investments in early
childhood nutrition.
V. Empirical Results
A. Sibling Rivalry, Parent Perceptions, and Child Ability
Since we are building on the sibling rivalry literature, we begin our analysis
estimating equation (1), which uses the standard observable family
composition characteristics, number of siblings, number of sisters, and birth
order.12 Results of this regression are presented in table 2, column 1. The
number of sisters has a positive correlation with enrollment, consistent with
sibling rivalry in the presence of promale bias in returns to school (Morduch
2000). As discussed in Section II, a typical explanation for sibling rivalry is that
rivalry is driven by constraints inducing parents to invest in human capital on
the basis of differences in expected returns to investment in their offspring. In
settings in which the expected returns are higher for boys than for girls, having
more girls (low-return children) lowers competition over resources and raises
investments in all children. With the number of sisters held constant, the
addition of a male sibling is correlated with a 2.5 percentage point (or 4.6%)
lower likelihood of attending school. Switching from a male to a female sibling
is correlated with a 2.2 percentage point higher likelihood of enrollment, or
4.1% of the base enrollment. Birth order has a positive coefficient, indicating
that younger siblings are more likely to be enrolled, as is consistent with the
literature in developing countries. Children with better-educated or wealthier
parents are more likely to be enrolled, which is consistent with intergener-
ational education transmission and wealth effects.
As discussed in Section IV.A, other factors about the child besides these
observable demographic characteristics are likely to influence the parents’
schooling investment decision. Parents know more about their children’s12 These counts of the number of siblings and number of sisters include both resident and
nonresident children. Results are robust to restricting these variables to measure only the number of
resident siblings and sisters.
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TABLE 2
MARGINAL EFFECTS FROM LOGIT AND CONDITIONAL LOGIT REGRESSIONS ESTIMATING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
CURRENT SCHOOL ENROLLMENT, SIBLING RIVALRY, AND PARENT PERCEPTIONS
Dependent Variable: Current Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Parent perceptions of child’s chance of success








Highest sibling perception −.065***
[.019]
Higher sibling dummy (1 if any sibling with a
higher perceived chance of success) −.070**
[.033]
One higher sibling dummy (1 if only one sibling
with a higher perceived chance of success) −.053
[.035]
Two higher sibling dummy (1 if two siblings with
a higher perceived chance of success) −.076
[.048]
Three or more higher sibling dummy (1 if three or
more siblings with a higher perceived chance
of success) −.146**
[.063]
Number of siblings −.025*** −.025*** −.027*** −.026***
[.009] [.009] [.009] [.009]
Number of sisters .022** .021** .022** .022**
[.010] [.010] [.010] [.010]
Birth order .016* .027*** .025** .027***
[.009] [.010] [.010] [.010]
Male .033* .041** .028 .029 .029
[.019] [.019] [.019] [.019] [.019]
Parent schooling (either parent ever enrolled = 1) .180*** .169*** .164*** .165***
[.040] [.044] [.044] [.044]
Log household assets .018* .017* .017 .017
[.010] [.010] [.010] [.010]
Age fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects? Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Household fixed effects? No Yes No No No
Number of children 4,641 3,211 4,538 4,538 4,538
Source. Burkina Faso Social Protection Evaluation data from 2008.
Note. Robust standard errors are in brackets, clustered at the village level. Columns 1, 3, 4, and 5 present
marginal effects for logit regressions. Column 2 presents marginal effects from a household fixed-effects
conditional logit regression. Regressions are restricted to children aged 5–15, and number of siblings and
number of sisters are for all siblings and sisters in the household. Regression sample includes 4,641
children, of which 4,538 have parent perceptionmeasures and 3,211 have siblings with differing outcomes
and parent perception measures.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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170 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Echaracteristics than simply their gender and sibling composition. Since it is the
parents’ perceptions of their child’s ability or potential for future success,
whether correct or not, that inform and affect their decision about educational
investment, we first examine the relationship between school enrollment and
these parents’ perceptions about each of their children.13 We estimate both a
household fixed-effects conditional logit model as in equation (2) and an
extended sibling rivalry logit regression as in equation (3), and in columns 2–5
of table 2 we present the corresponding results.14We find a positive relationship
between what parents think about a child and his current enrollment. On the
other hand, perceptions of the child’s siblings in the same age group have a
negative relationship with the child’s enrollment, suggesting that parents make
educational investment decisions on the basis of not only what they think of
one child but also what they think of that child’s siblings.
The household fixed-effects specification in table 2, column 2, shows that
children with one level higher parental perceptions compared to the average
perceptions of their siblings have an 18.4 percentage point higher probability
of enrollment, which corresponds to a 34.1% higher enrollment level. In
columns 3–5, we explicitly estimate the relationship between parent percep-
tions about the child’s siblings and a child’s enrollment. When we control for
direct measures of parent perceptions of siblings, parental perceptions of the
child are still positively correlated with the child’s enrollment. One level higher
parent perceptions is correlated with a 10.9–16.2 percentage point higher
likelihood of enrollment. However, parental perceptions of a child’s siblings are
negatively correlated with the child’s enrollment. Compared to the household
fixed-effects specification in which the parental perceptions of the child are
compared to the average of his siblings, an alternative is tomake the comparison
with the parental perceptions of the “best” sibling. Results in column 3 show
that children whose sibling with the highest perception in the family has a one
level higher value have a 6.5 percentage point lower likelihood of enrollment.
Relative sibling perceptions might be more relevant than absolute sibling
perceptions since having a sibling whom the parents think of more highly than13 The parent perception variable takes values of 0–3, where 0 means a child has a small chance o
future success, 1 a medium chance, 2 a large chance, and 3 a very large chance. Parents on average
report that their children have amedium chance of success, with the variable having amean of 1.2 and a
standard deviation of 0.9. In the survey, we also record the identity of the person reporting the
perception (father, mother, or other adult family member). For 80.5% of the children, the father
reports his perceptions, while for 13.5% of the children, the mother reports her perceptions. The
remaining 6% of children have perceptions reported by another adult family member. Results are
robust to estimating the table 2 regressions using only perceptions of the father, using only perceptions
of themother, or excluding the children whose perceptions were not reported by the biological parents
14 Parent perceptions may be influenced by the child’s enrollment status, and therefore, the results
presented in this table should not necessarily be interpreted as causal.
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Akresh et al. 171oneself could matter more than the overall perception level of one’s siblings.
Column 4 uses an indicator if the child has any sibling with higher parental
perceptions, while column 5 uses indicators for whether the child has one, two,
or three or more siblings with higher parental perceptions. Children having a
sibling with higher parent perceptions have a 7.0 percentage point lower proba-
bility of enrollment. Children with three or more siblings with higher parental
perceptions have a 14.6 percentage point lower probability of being enrolled.
While parental perceptions about their child’s chance of future success are
correlated with the child’s current school enrollment, these perceptions may or
may not be accurate or well informed.Theremay be significant differences across
households in howparents perceive their own children andwhat factors they take
into account in formulating perceptions. Nevertheless, it is likely that parents’
decisions are related to their perceptions, and so analyzing these perceptions
provides useful insights and takes advantage of a unique variable in the data set
that we can then corroborate with more “objective” measures of ability. We
incorporate an externally validated measure of the child’s cognitive ability using
the Raven’s CPM test. These tests were administered during the baseline survey
to every child aged 5–15 regardless of his or her current enrollment status and
provide a consistent measure of child ability across children in all households.
There is a strong positive relationship between the ability measure and parent
perceptions. Higher-ability children are viewed by their parents as having a
higher chance of future success.However, after we control for gender and age, the
abilitymeasure explains only about 20% of the variation in parental perceptions.
In table 3,we estimate the relationshipbetween child ability (asmeasuredby the
Raven’s age adjusted z-score) and current school enrollment using a household
fixed-effects conditional logit as described in equation (2) and a logit regression
with alternative sibling ability measures as described in equation (3).15 The
household fixed-effects logit results in column 1 indicate that a child with one
standard deviation higher own ability compared to the average of his siblings
has a 16.4 percentage point higher likelihood of being currently enrolled,
corresponding to 30.4% of the base enrollment. The coefficient is significant at
the 1% level. This is evidence that parents take into account a child’s cognitive
ability in deciding enrollment, and the magnitude of the effect is large.
When considering how parents decide on enrollment, one approach would
be for them to compare a child’s ability with his siblings’ average ability, and15 All regressions include child gender and age dummies, and the regressions estimating eq. (3) also
include village fixed effects, parent schooling, household assets, and family demographic composition
measures. Results presented in table 3 are consistent when using the number of siblings and the
number of sisters aged 5–15 rather than the number of siblings and sisters aged 0–15. Correlation
among the error terms of children in a given village experiencing the same enrollment environment
might bias the standard errors downward, so in all regressions we cluster the standard errors by village.
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TABLE 3
MARGINAL EFFECTS FROM LOGIT AND CONDITIONAL LOGIT REGRESSIONS ESTIMATING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
CURRENT SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AND CHILD ABILITY
Dependent Variable: Current Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own ability (Raven’s age-adjusted z-score) .164*** .147*** .096*** .086***
[.017] [.014] [.016] [.016]
Highest sibling ability −.067***
[.013]
Higher sibling dummy (1 if any sibling with
an ability > own ability) −.106***
[.023]
One higher sibling dummy (1 if only one
sibling with an ability > own ability) −.082***
[.024]
Two higher sibling dummy (1 if two siblings
with an ability > own ability) −.161***
[.031]
Three or more higher sibling dummy (1 if
three or more siblings with an ability
> own ability) −.172***
[.042]
Number of siblings −.020** −.024*** −.018**
[.009] [.009] [.009]
Number of sisters .018* .020** .019*
[.010] [.010] [.010]
Birth order .029*** .026*** .031***
[.010] [.009] [.010]
Male .027 .020 .021 .020
[.020] [.020] [.020] [.020]
Parent schooling (either parent ever






Log household assets .018* .019* .019*
[.010] [.010] [.010]
Age fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects? No Yes Yes Yes
Household fixed effects? Yes No No No
Number of children 2,862 4,641 4,641 4,641
Source. Burkina Faso Social Protection Evaluation data from 2008.
Note. Robust standard errors are in brackets, clustered at the village level. Column 1 presents marginal
effects from a household fixed-effects conditional logit regression. Columns 2–4 present marginal effects
for logit regressions. Regressions are restricted to children aged 5–15, and number of siblings and number
of sisters are for all siblings and sisters in the household. Regression sample includes 4,641 children, with
2,862 having siblings with differing enrollment outcomes. Own and sibling ability are measured using the
Raven’s CPM and normed by age (z-score).
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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Akresh et al. 173this is captured in the household fixed-effects specification. An alternative that
takes into account the nonlinear relationship between siblings’ abilities would
consider the impact of the sibling with the highest ability. Another approach
would include relative measures indicating if the child has any sibling with a
higher ability measure or whether the child has one, two, or three or more
siblings with higher ability measures.16 When we control for these direct
measures of sibling ability (in cols. 2–4), the child’s own ability is still positively
correlated with his enrollment and statistically significant at the 1% level. One
standard deviation higher own ability is correlated with a 15.9%–27.2% higher
likelihood of enrollment compared to the base enrollment level. Having one’s
“best” sibling have a one standard deviation higher ability is correlated with a
6.7 percentage point lower enrollment rate (col. 2). Likewise, having any
sibling with a higher ability is correlated with a 10.6 percentage point lower
likelihood of being enrolled (col. 3), and this effect is magnified if there are two
siblings with higher abilities (16.1 percentage points). These coefficients are all
significant at the 1% level.17
Including child ability and sibling ability measures does not significantly
alter the family demographic composition variables. The sign and level of
statistical significance are consistent with the initial regression presented in
table 2, column 1, while the magnitude of the coefficient for the number of
siblings and number of sisters is somewhat reduced. Overall, these sibling
ability rivalry results are consistent with the parental perceptions regressions in
table 2 and indicate that part of what is driving the relationship between
parental perceptions and the school enrollment decision is the child’s ability.1816 Results are robust to additional sibling ability measures including median sibling ability, the
number of siblings with a higher ability, dummies for whether a child’s ability is highest or lowest in
the household, and whether the child has any siblings who have ability measures one-half or one
standard deviation higher.
17 School investments potentially involve dynamic effects such as state dependence once a child is
enrolled, and this could mean that younger and older children face different constraints; therefore,
different sibling rivalries are relevant for their enrollment decision. To address this issue that the
regressions combine young and old children and treat the relationship between ability and enrollment
symmetrically for all children, we estimate a series of regressions (results not shown) in which we split
the sample of children into younger (ages 5–9) and older (ages 10–15) children, as well as split the
sibling ability measures into variables for younger and older siblings. For young children, having a
higher-ability young sibling in the same age range has a significant negative impact on own
enrollment, but there is no relationship between older sibling ability and enrollment. This result that
young children are competing with other young siblings for school investments contrasts with that for
older children, who appear to be competing with both younger and older siblings.
18 We also explore whether the relationship between child ability and enrollment is altered by the
gender of the child, household wealth, or parental schooling by including interactions of these
variables with the ability measure. While sibling rivalry appears to be more important for girls than
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margin of school enrollment, we next turn to the intensive margin of educa-
tional expenditures. This allows us to rule out the interpretation that the results
presented in tables 2 and 3 reflect solely the desire of the child to attend school.
If a higher-ability child intrinsically has more motivation for attending school,
that could potentially explain the table 3 results showing a relationship between
ability and enrollment. However, a child with more desire to attend school
would not explain the table 4 results that show a relationship between child
ability and parents’discretionary education expenditures.We focus on expenses
for school supplies and parent association voluntary fees because these have a
discretionary component, whereby parents have some leeway in how much
they spend on each of their children.19 For the regressions presented in table 4,
we restrict the sample of 4,641 children aged 5–15 living in households with
multiple siblings to only the 2,514 children who are currently enrolled in
school.We estimate a series of regressions similar to those in table 3 (household
fixed effects in col. 1 and then alternative sibling ability measures in cols. 2–4).
Results in column 1 indicate that within a given household, children with a one
standard deviation higher ability receive FCFA 174 more in discretionary
expenditures, representing 20.7% of mean discretionary expenses, and the
coefficient is significant at the 1% level. Controlling directly for alternative
functional forms of sibling ability in columns 2–4 does not alter the positive
relationship between a child’s own ability and educational expenses, with
coefficients ranging from FCFA 114 to FCFA 142. Finally, children with two
siblings of higher ability have FCFA 140 lower educational expenditures,
corresponding to 16.6% of discretionary educational expenses.
B. Robustness Checks
To test the robustness of our results, we present four tables of regressions in
which we explore different educational outcomes, use two approaches to
address potential reverse causality issues between schooling and cognitive
ability, anduse alternative cognitive tests tomeasure child ability. First, in table 5,
we present results for alternative schooling outcomes including ever enrolled infor boys, we cannot reject the equality of coefficients between the genders. Likewise, while the
estimates for poor families (defined as households with log assets below the mean, below the
median, or in the bottom quintile) are larger, we cannot reject that poor and nonpoor families have
the same level of sibling rivalry. Finally, we cannot reject that children of educated and uneducated
parents have the same levels of sibling rivalry.
19 School registration fees are not considered since all enrolled children have to pay the same fees.
School meal fees, lodging fees, uniforms, and transportation expenses are the other educational
expenses that are not included as these have much less variation across siblings within a household.
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TABLE 4
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSIONS ESTIMATING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISCRETIONARY EDUCATION
EXPENDITURES AND CHILD ABILITY, ONLY ENROLLED CHILDREN
Dependent Variable: Discretionary Education
Expenditures on Supplies and Parent
Associations Fees (FCFA)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own ability (Raven’s age-adjusted z-score) 174.40*** 142.48** 125.64* 114.13
[53.78] [54.99] [69.82] [75.09]
Highest sibling ability −38.49
[40.41]
Higher sibling dummy (1 if any sibling in household
with an ability > own ability) −10.66
[66.09]
One higher sibling ability dummy (1 if only one
sibling in household with an ability > own ability) 27.98
[71.62]
Two higher sibling ability dummy (1 if two
siblings in household with an ability >
own ability) −139.67*
[76.49]
Three or more higher sibling ability dummy
(1 if three or more siblings in household
with an ability > own ability) −50.46
[139.60]
Number of siblings 25.65 22.24 26.11
[34.31] [33.48] [35.31]
Number of sisters −68.59* −67.28* −68.50*
[40.04] [39.95] [40.21]
Birth order −17.31 −22.02 −14.01
[38.79] [39.76] [37.67]
Male −80.95 −63.54 −62.85 −62.57
[84.80] [67.69] [68.29] [68.06]
Parent schooling (either parent ever






Log household assets 12.14 11.68 12.27
[25.79] [25.56] [25.91]
Age fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects? No Yes Yes Yes
Household fixed effects? Yes No No No
Number of children 1,999 2,514 2,514 2,514
Source. Burkina Faso Social Protection Evaluation data from 2008.
Note. Robust standard errors in are brackets, clustered at the village level. All regressions are restricted to
children aged 5–15 who are currently enrolled in school. Discretionary education expenditures are the sum
of per-child expenses for school supplies and other parent association fees in FCFA, with a mean of FCFA
841. The regression in col. 1 includes household fixed effects, and the sample is restricted to children in
households with at least two enrolled children. Columns 2–4 include village fixed effects, and the sample is
restricted to children who are currently enrolled. Own and sibling ability are measured using the Raven’s
CPM and normed by age (z-score).
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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TABLE 5
MARGINAL EFFECTS FROM LOGIT AND CONDITIONAL LOGIT REGRESSIONS ESTIMATING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

































One higher sibling dummy (1 if
only one sibling with an






Two higher sibling dummy
(1 if two siblings with an






Three or more higher sibling
dummy (1 if three or more







Number of siblings −.015* −.009 −.012**
[.009] [.008] [.006]
Number of sisters .015 .017* .017**
[.010] [.010] [.006]
Birth order .025** −.005 .016**
[.010] [.010] [.007]
Male .038* .033* .011 .002 .048** .028**
[.022] [.019] [.023] [.017] [.021] [.014]
Parent schooling (either parent






Log household assets .023** .026*** .014**
[.011] [.008] [.006]
Age fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Household fixed effects? Yes No Yes No Yes No
Number of children 2,757 4,641 2,724 4,641 2,597 4,487
Source. Burkina Faso Social Protection Evaluation data from 2008.
Note. Robust standard errors are in brackets, clustered at the village level. Columns 1 and 3 present
marginal effects for a household fixed-effects conditional logit regression. Columns 2 and 4 present
marginal effects for logit regressions. Column 5 uses ordinary least squares and includes household fixed
effects, while col. 6 includes village fixed effects. Regressions are restricted to children aged 5–15. On-time
start indicates if the child started school by age 7 or younger, and grade progression is the child’s grade in
school divided by the number of years since the child started school and ranges from 0 to 1. Own and
sibling ability are measured using the Raven’s CPM and normed by age. Regression sample includes 4,641
children who also have siblings in their household. Owing to missing data on the number of years since the
child started school, the sample size in col. 6 is only 4,487.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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Akresh et al. 177school, on-time school start, and grade progression through school. Results are
consistent with those in table 3 for current enrollment.We use household fixed
effects as well as the relative measure of whether a child has one, two, or three or
more siblings of higher ability.20 Relative to the base levels, in the household
fixed-effects specifications (cols. 1, 3, and 5), children with one standard
deviation higher own ability are 29%more likely to be ever enrolled, 40%more
likely to start school on time, and 28%more likely to progress through school.
Children with one sibling of higher ability have a lower probability of these
outcomes (12% lower level of ever being enrolled, 10% lower level of starting
school on time, and 8% lower level of grade progression). Negative effects are
larger for children who have two siblings of higher ability (28% lower level of
ever being enrolled, 24% lower level of starting school on time, and 21% lower
level of grade progression).
Second, in table 6, we attempt to address the potential reverse causality of
schooling affecting a child’s cognitive ability by limiting the regression sample
to childrenwho are in grade 2 or grade 1 or not enrolled (cols. 1–4) and children
in grade 1 or not enrolled (cols. 5–8) because the regression evidence discussed
previously indicates that children in these grades have not yet received enough
schooling to influence their cognitive ability test scores. Results for this re-
stricted sample are consistent with those in table 3. Household fixed-effects
logit regressions in columns 1 and 5 indicate that within a given household,
relative to the base enrollment levels, a child with one standard deviation higher
ability is, respectively, 32% and 34%more likely to be enrolled.21 Children with
two siblings of higher ability have a 6.1 or 3.9 percentage point lower
probability of enrollment (cols. 4 and 8, respectively), corresponding to 17.4%
and 17.0% of the base level of enrollment.
Third, in table 7, we further address any potential reverse causality between
schooling and cognitive ability by using the ability measure of young children
who are not enrolled in 2007–8 to measure the effect on schooling in 2008–9.
This approach eliminates any potential effect of schooling on the abilitymeasure
as these children had never been enrolled at the time of taking the ability test, so
the comparison is for the children not enrolled in year 1 to their siblings who are
not enrolled. In columns 1–4, we first consider only children aged 5–7 and not
enrolled in year 1 since many children in Burkina Faso are not enrolled at this
young age. Then in columns 5–8, we further restrict the sample to only children20 We also estimate regressions including the highest sibling ability and whether the child has any
sibling of higher ability and find consistent results; but because of space limitations, we present the
limited set of results.
21 Mean enrollment for the sample of children in grade 2 or grade 1 or not enrolled (cols. 1–4) is
0.35, while for children in grade 1 or not enrolled (cols. 5–8), average enrollment is 0.23.
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TABLE 7
MARGINAL EFFECTS FROM LOGIT AND CONDITIONAL LOGIT REGRESSIONS ESTIMATING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT IN YEAR 2 AND CHILD ABILITY MEASURED IN YEAR 1
Dependent Variable: Current Enrollment Year 2


















Highest sibling ability −.042* −.075**
[.022] [.029]
Higher sibling dummy (1 if
any sibling with an




One higher sibling dummy
(1 if only one sibling with




Two higher sibling dummy
(1 if two siblings with an




Three or more higher sibling
dummy (1 if three or more





Number of siblings −.031 −.035* −.031 −.026 −.030 −.027
[.021] [.021] [.022] [.022] [.023] [.023]
Number of sisters .011 .015 .013 .004 .008 .005
[.023] [.023] [.024] [.029] [.030] [.030]
Birth order .056** .055** .057** .071*** .070*** .073***
[.025] [.026] [.026] [.025] [.026] [.026]
Male −.183 −.072 −.073 −.076* −.16 −.074 −.076 −.080
[.129] [.045] [.045] [.044] [.197] [.057] [.056] [.054]
Household characteristics? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects? No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Household fixed effects? Yes No No No Yes No No No
Number of children 123 647 647 647 52 446 446 446
Source. Burkina Faso Social Protection Evaluation data from 2008 and 2009.
Note. Robust standard errors are in brackets, clustered at the village level. Columns 1 and 5 present
marginal effects from a household fixed-effects conditional logit regression. Columns 2–4 and 6–8 present
marginal effects for logit regressions. Regressions in cols. 1–4 are restricted to children aged 5–7 whowere
not enrolled during year 1 and in cols. 5–8 are restricted to children aged 5–6whowere not enrolled during
year 1. The sample includes 647 children aged 5–7, with 123 having siblings with differing enrollment
outcomes. The sample includes 446 children aged 5–6, with 52 having siblings with differing enrollment
outcomes. Mean enrollment in year 2 for the sample of children aged 5–7 (cols. 1–4) is 0.29, while for
children aged 5–6 (cols. 5–8) average enrollment in year 2 is 0.27. Sibling ability measures are for all siblings
not enrolled during year 1.Own and sibling ability aremeasuredusing the Raven’s CPMand normed by age
(z-score).
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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Akresh et al. 181aged 5–6 and not enrolled in year 1 to remove any potential concern that the not
enrolled 7-year-olds are somehow different from other 7-year-old children.22
The household fixed-effects logit regressions in columns 1 and 5 indicate that
within a given household, a young child with a one standard deviation higher
ability measured in year 1 is, respectively, 19.1 and 20.3 percentage points
more likely to be subsequently enrolled in year 2.23 The coefficient in column 1
is statistically significant at the 5% level. While the coefficient in column 5 is
not statistically significant at standard levels, there are only 52 children in the
regression as the household fixed-effects logit is identified only from house-
holds with multiple children aged 5–6 who were not enrolled in year 1. Young
children 5–6 years old who are not enrolled in year 1 and who have two siblings
of higher ability who also are not enrolled in year 1 subsequently have a 17.1
percentage point lower probability of enrollment in year 2 (col. 8).
Fourth, in table 8, we present two alternative measures of a child’s cognitive
ability. To allay any concerns that transforming the Raven’s scores into age-
adjusted z-scores might have introduced bias, in columns 1–4, we estimate
regressions using the Raven’s raw test score. Results are consistent with those in
table 3. In the household fixed-effects specification, within a given household, a
child with a one standard deviation higher Raven’s raw score (3.35 questions)
has an 18.4 percentage point higher likelihood of being enrolled. In columns
5–8, we also employ an alternativemeasure of cognitive ability, theWISCDigit
Span, to examine the relationship with current enrollment and find results
consistent with using the Raven’s test. Children with a one standard deviation
higher ownWISC z-score have a 17–22 percentage point higher probability of
enrollment, representing 32%–41% of the mean enrollment level. Children
with two siblings having a higher WISC z-score have a 14 percentage point
lower probability of enrollment (26% of the mean level of enrollment).
VI. Conclusions
In this article, we find strong evidence of sibling rivalry when parents make
educational investment decisions in rural Burkina Faso. However, in contrast
with previous research that generally focuses on easily observable demographic
characteristics to measure sibling rivalry, we use measures of a child’s own
cognitive ability and different specifications of his siblings’ abilities to test for
how parents make schooling investment decisions. We examine both the22 In 2007–8, 74% of children aged 5–7 were not enrolled, and of these children, 31% were then
enrolled in 2008–9. For children 5–6 years old, 89% of them were not enrolled in 2007–8, and of
these children, 28% were then enrolled in the subsequent year.
23 Mean enrollment in year 2 for the sample of children aged 5–7 (cols. 1–4) is 0.29, while for
children aged 5–6 (cols. 5–8) average enrollment in year 2 is 0.27.
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184 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eextensive margin (school enrollment and grade progression) and the intensive
margin of discretionary school expenditures. Own ability has a positive effect
on educational outcomes, after controlling for individual and family charac-
teristics and when using a family fixed-effects specification.We find that within
a given household a child with one standard deviation higher ability compared
to the average ability of his siblings is 30%more likely to be enrolled. The im-
pact of ability on enrollment is also large relative to the corresponding relation-
ship between enrollment and the standard demographic variables traditionally
used in the sibling rivalry literature. Estimating a regression of standardized
coefficients indicates that the impact of ability is three to five times larger than
for the demographic variables. Regardless of how wemeasure sibling ability, we
find evidence of sibling rivalry, and our results are particularly strong when we
consider relative measures of sibling ability. The magnitude of these impacts is
large. For a child who has one higher-ability sibling, the probability of enroll-
ment declines by 15%, and having two higher-ability siblings lowers enroll-
ment by 30%. Our findings are robust to using alternative objective measures
of cognitive ability and the parents’ perceptions of a child’s chance of future
success and to addressing issues about the potential reverse causality of school-
ing influencing child ability measures.
Our results can likely be generalized to other developing countries that have
not yet achieved universal primary or secondary education and in which
parents are deciding whether to send their children to school in a given year.
This article explores the context in which the decision is made during primary
school, whereas in other countries the choice may occur later in a child’s
education. A more complete understanding of how parents make the edu-
cational investment decision is useful for policy makers. Our findings that
high-ability children within a family are more likely to be enrolled and receive
more educational resources suggest that parents focus on getting the most
talented children through higher levels of education rather than spreading
some education evenly among all of their children. If fixed costs for schooling
and nonconvexities in the education production function are important factors
in the decision to not invest in education equally across all children, then
supply-side schooling interventions (such as the building of schools, reduction
in class size, or school inputs such as textbooks or uniforms) to raise the
schooling of all children and achieve the Millennium Development Goals
might not be effective if they are not large enough to overcome these non-
convexities. These types of policies might raise the schooling of the more
talented children rather than the schooling of all children, and so to increase
overall education rates, demand-side policies, such as conditional cash transfers
or school feeding programs, might be necessary.This content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:34:52 PM
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